United States Army
The US Regular Army on the eve of the Civil War served primarily in a frontier constabulary role. It comprised 16,000 officers and men, organized into 198 companies and scattered across the nation in 79 different posts. At the war’s start, 183 companies were either on frontier duty or in transit. The remaining 15, mostly coastal artillery batteries, guarded the Canadian border, the Atlantic coast, or the nation’s 23 arsenals. In 1861 Lieutenant General Winfield Scott commanded this army. A 75-year-old hero of the Mexican-American War, his position as general in chief was traditional, not statutory. Since 1821 Secretaries of War designated a general to be in charge of the field forces without formal congressional approval. The field forces were controlled through a series of geographic departments whose commanders reported directly to the general in chief. With modification this department system characterized Union and Confederate administration of regions under military control.
By 1860 a system of bureaus whose senior officers were in the twilight of long careers in their technical fields handled Army administration. Six of the 10 bureau chiefs were more than 70 years old. These bureaus, modeled after the British system, answered directly to the War Department. They were not subject to the general in chief’s orders. Predecessors of many of today’s combat support and combat service support branches, the following bureaus had been established by 1861:
- Adjutant General
- Inspector General
- Topographic Engineer (merged with the Engineer Bureau in 1863)
- Judge Advocate General
During the war, Congress elevated the Office of the Provost Marshal and the Signal Corps to bureau status. It also created a Cavalry Bureau. No operational planning or intelligence staff existed since no such structure had been required before the Civil War. This system provided suitable civilian control and administrative support to the small field army in the years before 1861. However, the bureau system also responded effectively, if not always efficiently, to the mass mobilization required over the next four years. Indeed, it would remain essentially intact until the early 20th century. In forming its own army and administrative structure, the Confederate government modeled its efforts on the US Army. In fact, many important figures in Confederate bureaus had served in one of the prewar bureaus.
Raising the Armies
With the outbreak of war in April 1861, both sides faced the monumental task of organizing and equipping armies much larger than the prewar force structure. The North retained control of the Regular Army, leaving the South to create its own regular force, although the latter existed primarily on paper. However, a large portion of the prewar officer corps joined the newly formed Confederate Army, including many of exceptional talent. Of 1,108 Regular officers serving as of 1 January 1861, 270 ultimately resigned to join the South. Only a few hundred of the 15,135 enlisted men left the ranks.
The North considered two options for employing the Regular Army: dispersing the existing units to train a newly raised volunteer force and committing them to the field without disruption. Initially, Scott envisioned a relatively small force to defeat the rebellion. He therefore insisted that the Regulars fight as units. Although some Regular units fought well in the war’s early battles, this decision ultimately limited their impact on the war. Battle losses and disease soon thinned their ranks. Officials seeking replacements found themselves in competition with state organizations raising volunteer regiments. Many Regular units became so depleted that they were withdrawn from frontline service in November 1864. The commitment and wastage of Regulars in field deployments ensured their absence from the training base. Consequently, volunteer officers and men with little or no prior military service comprised most of the Union war effort.
Neither side had difficulty in recruiting the numbers initially required to fill the expanding ranks. In April 1861 President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 men from the states’ militias for a three-month period. This figure represented an estimate of the number of soldiers required to quell the rebellion. The states first recruited their already existent militia companies and secured nearly 92,000. However, many of these soldiers lacked effective training and leadership. The war’s continuation and expansion generated additional demands for manpower. In the North the federal government established quotas for local districts to fill. Similarly, the Confederate Congress authorized the acceptance of 100,000 one-year volunteers in March 1861. One-third of these men were under arms within a month. The Southern spirit of voluntarism was so strong that possibly twice that number could have been enlisted had sufficient arms and equipment been available.
In 1861 the US War Department considered making recruitment a federal responsibility, but this proposal seemed unnecessary for the short war then envisioned. Therefore, responsibility for recruiting remained with the states. Northern and Southern state governors continually encouraged local constituents to form new volunteer regiments. This practice strengthened support for local, state, and national politicians and provided an opportunity for glory and high rank for ambitious men. Such local recruiting created regiments with strong bonds among the men, but it hindered the flow of replacements to existing regiments. The Confederates attempted to funnel replacements into units from their same state or region, but the North continued to create new regiments. Existing Union regiments detailed men back home to recruit replacements, but their efforts could not compete with the allure of joining a new, local unit. New regiments thus lacked seasoned veterans to train the recruits while the battle-tested regiments lost men faster than they could replace them. Indeed, many regiments on both sides were reduced to combat ineffectiveness as the war progressed. Seasoned regiments were therefore often disbanded or consolidated, usually against the wishes of the men assigned.
As the war continued and casualty lists grew, the glory of volunteering faded. Both sides resorted to conscription to secure more soldiers. The Confederates enacted the first conscription law in American history in April 1862. The North followed suit in March 1863. These first experiments in American conscription proved inefficient and suffered from flawed administration. Conscription laws tended to exempt wealthier citizens, and numerous draftees hired substitutes or paid commutation fees. As a result, the average conscript’s health, capability, and morale proved poor. Many eligible men, particularly in the South, enlisted to avoid the onus of being considered a conscript. Still, conscription, or the threat of conscription, helped to fill the ranks of both Union and Confederate armies.
Conscription was never a popular program. The North tried several approaches to limit conscription requirements. These efforts included offering lucrative bounties, or fees paid to induce volunteers to fill required quotas. The federal government also offered a series of reenlistment bonuses, including money, 30-day furloughs, and the opportunity for long-serving regiments to maintain their colors and receive the designation “veteran” volunteer infantry regiments. The Invalid Corps, later renamed the Veteran Reserve Corps, comprised men unfit for frontline service who performed essential rear-area duties. The North also recruited almost 179,000 African-Americans for service in separately organized volunteer regiments. This source of manpower soon became subject to conscription as well. In the South the recruitment or conscription of slaves remained a sensitive subject. It was not attempted until March 1865, too late to influence the war.
The imperfect mobilization machinery nevertheless provided large numbers of soldiers to feed the war’s demands. Approximately 2 million men enlisted in the Union Army between 1861 and 1865. Nearly half were under arms at war’s end. An estimated 750,000 to 800,000 men served in the Confederate military over the course of the war; however, peak strength never exceeded 460,000. The methods of manpower mobilization found expression in World Wars I and II. The lessons learned from the Civil War experience directly influenced the Selective Service System crafted and implemented in both of the later conflicts.
Union and Confederate armies followed similar organizational patterns that reflected their common roots. In the North each of the 10 prewar Regular Army regiments consisted of 10 87-man companies with a maximum authorized strength of 878. At the war’s start nine more infantry regiments were established, each following an organizational structure adopted from the French. These “French model” regiments comprised 2,452 officers and men organized into three battalions. Each of the latter included eight 100-man companies. In effect, these new battalions resembled the prewar Regular Army regiments. The new structure sought to reduce staff officer slots, but it proved unfamiliar to most commanders. Consequently, the smaller, prewar regiments were the models for volunteer units in the North and South. The US War Department set the authorized strength for volunteer regiments at between 866 and 1,046 officers and men. The Confederate Congress fixed the size of its 10-company regiments at 1,045. However, only newer units had numbers approximating these authorizations. Combat casualties, sickness, leave, details, desertion, and straggling quickly reduced actual field strength.
The battery remained the basic artillery unit, although battalion and larger formal groupings of artillery emerged later in the war. The US Army included 60 batteries in 1861, organized into five regiments. At war’s start, however, the regiments performed largely administrative and personnel functions. In the field, batteries of the same regiment often did not serve together. Instead they were assigned to different infantry formations. Demands for additional artillery were met by creating volunteer batteries. By war’s end volunteer batteries constituted most of the artillery among the Union and Confederate armies. Union batteries often included six guns, an authorized strength that varied between 80 and 156 men, and up to 130 horses. Confederate batteries frequently included only four cannon due to limitations on available manpower and ordnance. Indeed, many batteries included a mix of cannon types.
Before the Civil War the Regular Army included five mounted regiments. They consisted of two dragoon, two cavalry, and one mounted rifle regiment. Another cavalry regiment was established shortly after the war’s outbreak. In August, all of these units were redesignated cavalry regiments and renumbered based on their date of organization. In July 1862 a common 12-company structure was applied. Authorized company strength varied from 79 to 95 men. Although the term “troop” was also introduced, most cavalrymen continued to use the more familiar term “company” to describe their units throughout the war. Union cavalry generally grouped two companies into a squadron and six squadrons into a regiment. Confederate cavalry regiments were authorized 10 76-man companies. Organizations larger than regiments tended to evolve throughout the war, but Union and Confederate armies gradually organized their mounted regiments into cavalry brigades, divisions, and corps.
For both infantry and cavalry, brigades comprised three to five regiments. Union brigades generally contained regiments from more than one state, while the Confederates often grouped regiments from the same state. Division structures varied, including two or more brigades. In the Confederate Army a brigadier general usually commanded a brigade and a major general commanded a division. The Union Army possessed no rank higher than an major general until 1864. Thus, colonels often commanded brigades, and brigadier generals led divisions.
How units performed in battle often depended on the quality of their individual leaders. The respective central governments appointed general officers. At the start of the war, most of the senior officers in the Union and Confederate armies had attended the US Military Academy (USMA), West Point, New York, or another military school. In 1861 Lincoln appointed 126 general officers, of which 82 were, or had been, professional officers. Jefferson Davis appointed 89, of which 44 had received professional training. The rest were political appointees, but of these only 16 Federal and seven Confederate generals had no military experience. Much has been made of the West Point backgrounds of the men who ultimately dominated the senior leadership positions of both armies, but such institutions did not prepare their graduates to command divisions, corps, or armies. Moreover, although many leaders had some combat experience from the Mexican War era, very few had experience above the company or battery level in the peacetime years before 1861. As a result, “professional” officers, in today’s terminology, did not initially conduct the war at any level. Leaders became more professional through experience and at the expense of their soldiers’ lives. General William T. Sherman would later note that the war did not enter its “professional stage” until 1863.
Of the volunteer officers who composed most of the leadership for both armies, state governors normally appointed colonels (regimental commanders). States appointed other field grade officers, although many were initially elected within their units. Company grade officers were usually elected by their men. This long-established militia tradition, which seldom made military leadership and capability a primary consideration, was largely an extension of the states’ rights philosophy and sustained political patronage in both the Union and the Confederacy.
Civil War Staffs
In the Civil War, large military organizations’ success often depended on the effectiveness of the commanders’ staffs. Modern staff procedures had evolved only gradually with the increased complexity of military operations. This evolution was far from complete in 1861, and throughout the war, commanders personally handled many vital staff functions, most notably operations and intelligence. The nature of American warfare up to the mid-19th century had not yet clearly overwhelmed single commanders’ capabilities. Civil War staffs were divided into a general staff and a staff corps. This terminology, defined by Winfield Scott in 1855, differs from modern definitions. Table 2 lists typical staff positions at army level, although key functions are represented down to regimental level. The chief of staff and aides-de-camp formed a commander’s personal staff. Hand-picked by the commander, their tenure changed with each turnover in army leadership. The remaining staff officers included representatives from the various bureaus. Logistics functions were particularly well represented. Collectively, staffs reflected the commander’s personality, work ethic, and philosophy. In an environment in which staff officers and commanders struggled to discover and master their responsibilities, micromanagement flourished, particularly among those commanders who considered themselves professional soldiers. Experience bred competence among commanders and staffs as the war continued. Consequently, the general effectiveness of army management and leadership tended to improve. However, neither the North nor the South provided a mechanism within which to train competent staff officers.
George B. McClellan, when he appointed his father-in-law as his chief of staff, was the first to use this title officially. Even though many senior commanders had a chief of staff, this position was not used in any uniform way. Seldom did the man in this role achieve the central coordinating authority of a modern chief of staff. This position, along with most other staff positions, was used as each commander saw fit. Hence staff functions and duties varied with each army commander. Inadequate use of the chief of staff was among the most important shortcomings of Civil War staffs. An equally important weakness was the lack of any formal operations or intelligence staff. Liaison procedures were also ill defined, and various staff officers or soldiers performed this function with little formal guidance. Miscommunication and lack of knowledge of friendly units repeatedly proved disastrous in combat.
During the 1850’s, in a technological revolution of major proportions, the rifle musket began to replace the relatively inaccurate smoothbore musket in ever‑increasing numbers, both in Europe and America. This process, accelerated by the Civil War, ensured that the rifled shoulder weapon would be the basic weapon used by infantrymen in both the Federal and Confederate armies.
The standard and most common shoulder weapon used in the American Civil War was the Springfield .58‑caliber rifle musket, models 1855, 1861, and 1863. In 1855, the US Army adopted this weapon to replace the .69‑caliber smoothbore musket and the .54‑caliber rifle. In appearance, the rifle musket was similar to the smoothbore musket. Both were single‑shot muzzleloaders, but the rifled bore of the new weapon substantially increased its range and accuracy. The rifling system chosen by the United States was designed by Claude Minié, a French Army officer. Whereas earlier rifles fired a round nonexpanding ball, the Minié system used a hollow‑based cylindro‑conoidal projectile slightly smaller than the bore that dropped easily into the barrel. When the powder charge was ignited by a fulminate of mercury percussion cap, the released powder gases expanded the base of the bullet into the rifled grooves, giving the projectile a ballistic spin.
The model 1855 Springfield rifle musket was the first regulation arm to use the hollow‑base .58‑caliber minie bullet. The slightly modified model 1861 was the principal infantry weapon of the Civil War, although two subsequent models in 1863 were produced in about equal quantities. The model 1861 was 56 inches long overall, had a 40‑inch barrel, and weighed 9 pounds 2 ounces with its bayonet. The 21‑ inch socket bayonet consisted of an 18‑inch triangular blade and 3‑inch socket. The Springfield had a rear sight graduated to 500 yards. The maximum effective range of this weapon was approximately 500 yards, although it had killing power at 1,000 yards. The round could penetrate 1111 inches of white‑pine board at 200 yards and 3¼ inches at 1,000 yards, with a penetration of 1 inch considered the equivalent of disabling a human being. Although the new weapons had increased accuracy and effectiveness, the soldiers’ vision was still obscured by the clouds of smoke produced by the rifle musket’s black powder propellant.
To load a muzzle‑loading rifle, the soldier took a paper cartridge in hand and tore the end of the paper with his teeth. Next, he poured the powder down the barrel and placed the bullet in the muzzle. Then, using a metal ramrod, he pushed the bullet firmly down the barrel until seated. He then cocked the hammer and placed the percussion cap on the cone or nipple, which, when struck by the hammer, ignited the gunpowder. The average rate of fire was three rounds per minute. A well‑trained soldier could possibly load and fire four times per minute, but in the confusion of battle, the rate of fire was probably slower, two to three rounds per minute. In addition to the Springfields, over 100 types of muskets, rifles, rifle muskets, and rifled muskets — ranging up to .79 caliber — were used during the American Civil War. The numerous American‑made weapons were supplemented early in the conflict by a wide variety of imported models.
The best, most popular, and most common of the foreign weapons was the British .577‑caliber Enfield rifle, model 1853, which was 54 inches long (with a 39‑inch barrel), weighed 8.7 pounds (9.2 with the bayonet), could be fitted with a socket bayonet with an 18‑inch blade, and had a rear sight graduated to 800 yards. The Enfield design was produced in a variety of forms, both long and short barreled, by several British manufacturers and at least one American company.
Of all the foreign designs, the Enfield most closely resembled the Springfield in characteristics and capabilities. The United States purchased over 436,000 Enfield‑pattern weapons during the war. Statistics on Confederate purchases are more difficult to ascertain, but a report dated February 1863 indicated that 70,980 long Enfields and 9,715 short Enfields had been delivered by that time, with another 23,000 awaiting delivery.
While the quality of imported weapons varied, experts considered the Enfields and the Austrian Lorenz rifle muskets to be very good. However, some foreign governments and manufacturers took advantage of the huge initial demand for weapons by dumping their obsolete weapons on the American market. This practice was especially prevalent with some of the older smoothbore muskets and converted flintlocks. The greatest challenge, however, lay in maintaining these weapons and supplying ammunition and replacement parts for calibers ranging from .44 to .79. The quality of the imported weapons eventually improved as the procedures, standards, and astuteness of the purchasers improved. For the most part, the European suppliers provided needed weapons, and the newer foreign weapons were highly regarded.
Breechloaders and repeating rifles were available by 1861 and were initially purchased in limited quantities, often by individual soldiers. Generally, however, these types of rifles were not issued to troops in large numbers because of technical problems (poor breech seals, faulty ammunition), fear by the Ordnance Department that the troops would waste ammunition, and the cost of rifle production. The most famous of the breechloaders was the single‑shot Sharps, produced in both carbine and rifle models. The model 1859 rifle was .52-caliber, 47⅛ inches long, and weighed 8¾ pounds, while the carbine was .52-caliber, 39⅛ inches long, and weighed 7¾ pounds. Both weapons used a linen cartridge and a pellet primer feed mechanism. Most Sharps carbines were issued to Federal cavalry units.
The best known of the repeaters was probably the seven‑shot .52-caliber Spencer, which came in both rifle and carbine models. The rifle was 47- inches long and weighed 10 pounds, while the carbine was 39-inches long and weighed 8¼ pounds. The Spencer was also the first weapon adopted by the US Army that fired a metallic rim‑fire, self‑contained cartridge. Soldiers loaded rounds through an opening in the butt of the stock, which fed into the chamber through a tubular magazine by the action of the trigger guard. The hammer still had to be cocked manually before each shot.
The Henry rifle was, in some ways, even better than either the Sharps or the Spencer. Although never adopted by the US Army in any quantity, it was purchased privately by soldiers during the war. The Henry was a 16‑shot, .44‑caliber rimfire cartridge repeater. It was 43½ inches long and weighed 9¼ pounds. The tubular magazine located directly beneath the barrel had a 15‑round capacity with an additional round in the chamber. Of the approximately 13,500 Henrys produced, probably 10,000 saw limited service. The government purchased only 1,731.
The Colt repeating rifle, model 1855 (or revolving carbine), also was available to Civil War soldiers in limited numbers. The weapon was produced in several lengths and calibers, the lengths varying from 32 to 42½ inches, while its calibers were .36, .44, and .56. The .36 and .44 calibers were made to chamber six shots, while the .56-caliber was made to chamber five shots. The Colt Firearms Company was also the primary supplier of revolvers (the standard sidearm for cavalry troops and officers), the .44‑caliber Army revolver and the .36‑caliber Navy revolver being the most popular (over 146,000 purchased). This was because they were simple, relatively sturdy, and reliable.
Initially armed with sabers and pistols (and in one case, lances), Federal cavalry troops quickly added the breech‑loading carbine to their inventory of weapons. Troops preferred the easier‑handling carbines to rifles and the breechloaders to awkward muzzleloaders. Of the single‑shot breech‑loading carbines that saw extensive use during the Civil War, the Hall .52-caliber accounted for approximately 20,000 in 1861. The Hall was quickly replaced by a variety of more state-of-the-art carbines, including the Merrill .54-caliber (14,495), Maynard .52-caliber (20,002), Gallager .53-caliber (22,728), Smith .52-caliber (30,062), Burnside .56- caliber (55,567), and Sharps .54-caliber (80,512). The next step in the evolutionary process was the repeating carbine, the favorite by 1864 (and commonly distributed by 1865) being the Spencer .52‑caliber seven‑shot repeater (94,194).
Because of the South’s limited industrial capacity, Confederate cavalrymen had a more difficult time arming themselves. Nevertheless, they too embraced the firepower revolution, choosing shotguns and muzzle‑loading carbines as well as multiple sets of revolvers as their primary weapons. In addition, Confederate cavalrymen made extensive use of battlefield salvage by recovering Federal weapons. However, the South’s difficulties in producing the metallic‑rimmed cartridges required by many of these recovered weapons limited their usefulness.
In 1841, the US Army selected bronze as the standard material for fieldpieces and at the same time adopted a new system of field artillery. The 1841 field artillery system consisted entirely of smoothbore muzzleloaders: 6‑ and 12‑pound guns; 12‑, 24‑, and 32‑pound howitzers; and 12‑pound mountain howitzers. A pre‑Civil War battery usually consisted of six fieldpieces—four guns and two howitzers. A 6‑pound battery contained four 6‑pound guns and two 12‑pound howitzers, while a 12‑pound battery had four 12‑pound guns and two 24‑pound howitzers. The guns fired solid shot, shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds, while howitzers fired shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds (artillery ammunition is described below).
The 6‑pound gun (effective range 1,523 yards) was the primary fieldpiece used from the time of the Mexican War until the Civil War. By 1861, however, the 1841 artillery system based on the 6‑pounder was obsolete. In 1857, a new and more versatile fieldpiece, the 12‑pound gun‑howitzer (Napoleon), model 1857, appeared on the scene. Designed as a multipurpose piece to replace existing guns and howitzers, the Napoleon fired canister and shell, like the 12‑pound howitzer, and solid shot comparable in range to the 12‑pound gun. The Napoleon was a bronze, muzzle‑loading smoothbore with an effective range of 1,619 yards. Served by a nine‑man crew, the piece could fire at a sustained rate of two aimed shots per minute. Like almost all smoothbore artillery, the Napoleon fired “fixed” ammunition—the projectile and powder were bound together with metal bands.
Another new development in field artillery was the introduction of rifling. Although rifled guns provided greater range and accuracy, smoothbores were generally more reliable and faster to load. Rifled ammunition was semifixed, so the charge and the projectile had to be loaded separately. In addition, the canister load of the rifle did not perform as well as that of the smoothbore. Initially, some smoothbores were rifled on the James pattern, but they soon proved unsatisfactory because the bronze rifling eroded too easily. Therefore, most rifled artillery was either wrought iron or cast iron with a wrought‑iron reinforcing band.
The most commonly used rifled guns were the 10‑pound Parrott and the Rodman, or 3‑inch ordnance rifle. The Parrott rifle was a cast‑iron piece, easily identified by the wrought‑iron band reinforcing the breech. The 10‑pound Parrott was made in two models: model 1861 had a 2.9‑inch rifled bore with three lands and grooves and a slight muzzle swell, while model 1863 had a 3‑inch bore and no muzzle swell. The Rodman or ordnance rifle was a long‑tubed, wrought‑iron piece that had a 3‑inch bore with seven lands and grooves. Ordnance rifles were sturdier and considered superior in accuracy and reliability to the 10‑pound Parrott.
A new weapon that made its first appearance in the war during the Overland Campaign was the 24-pound Coehorn mortar. Used exclusively by the North, the Coehorn fired a projectile in a high arcing trajectory and was ideal for lobbing shells into trenches in siege warfare. The Coehorn was used briefly during the fighting at the “bloody angle” at Spotsylvania and later in the trench lines at Cold Harbor.
By 1860, the ammunition for field artillery consisted of four general types for both smoothbores and rifles: solid shot, shell, case, and canister. Solid shot was a round cast‑iron projectile for smoothbores and an elongated projectile, known as a bolt, for rifled guns. Solid shot, with its smashing or battering effect, was used in a counterbattery role or against buildings and massed formations. The conical‑shaped bolt lacked the effectiveness of the cannonball because it tended to bury itself on impact instead of bounding along the ground like a bowling ball.
Shell, also known as common or explosive shell, whether spherical or conical, was a hollow projectile filled with an explosive charge of black powder that was detonated by a fuse. Shell was designed to break into jagged pieces, producing an antipersonnel effect, but the low‑order detonation seldom produced more than three to five fragments. In addition to its casualty‑producing effects, shell had a psychological impact when it exploded over the heads of troops. It was also used against field fortifications and in a counterbattery role. Case or case shot for both smoothbore and rifled guns was a hollow projectile with thinner walls than shell. The projectile was filled with round lead or iron balls set in a matrix of sulfur that surrounded a small bursting charge. Case was primarily used in an antipersonnel role. This type of round had been invented by Henry Shrapnel, a British artillery officer, hence the term “shrapnel.”
Last, there was canister, probably the most effective round and the round of choice at close range (400 yards or less) against massed troops. Canister was essentially a tin can filled with iron balls packed in sawdust with no internal bursting charge. When fired, the can disintegrated, and the balls followed their own paths to the target. The canister round for the 12‑pound Napoleon consisted of 27 1½‑inch iron balls packed inside an elongated tin cylinder. At extremely close ranges, men often loaded double charges of canister. By 1861, canister had replaced grapeshot in the ammunition chests of field batteries (grapeshot balls were larger than canister, and thus fewer could be fired per round).
|Commissioned Officers Hat Insignia, United States Army|
|General Officer||Staff Officer||Infantry||Artillery||Cavalry||Sharpshooter||Corps of
U.S. Army Enlisted
Service stripes were worn on the uniform's lower sleeve below the insignia of rank; each stripe denotes five years of service. Scarlet or light-blue trim around a stripe indicates service in wartime.
Cap badges, generally, identified the branch and regiment to which the wearer belonged. The badges were defined by regulation and policy, but in a vast war enforcement often seems less important. Officers purchased their own uniforms and insignia and could be inventive. Their cap badges were embroidered with silver and gold wire, sometimes following Army dictates and sometimes not.
Enlisted troops were issued their uniforms and insignia. Their cap badges were of stamped brass, in some cases they included their regiment number and company letter. Although of less frequency, they were also prone to imaginative substitutions.
|First Sergeant||Sergeant||Corporal||Musician||Private||Hat Insignia|
|Sergeant||Ferrier / Blacksmith||Corporal||Private / Bugler||Hat Insignia|
|First Sergeant||Sergeant||Corporal||Private||Hat Insignia|