Battle of Big Black River Bridge
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Reeling from their defeat at Champion Hill, the Confederates reached Big Black River Bridge, the night of May 16-17. Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton ordered Brig. Gen. John S. Bowen, with three brigades, to man the fortifications on the east bank of the river and impede any Union pursuit. Three divisions of Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand’s XIII Army Corps moved out from Edwards Station on the morning of the 17th. The corps encountered the Confederates behind breastworks and took cover as enemy artillery began firing. Union Brig. Gen. Michael K. Lawler formed his 2nd Brigade, Carr’s Division, which surged out of a meander scar, across the front of the Confederate forces, and into the enemy’s breastworks, held by Vaughn’s East Tennessee Brigade. Confused and panicked, the Rebels began to withdraw across the Big Black on two bridges: the railroad bridge and the steamboat dock moored athwart the river. As soon as they had crossed, the Confederates set fire to the bridges, preventing close Union pursuit. The fleeing Confederates who arrived in Vicksburg later that day were disorganized. The Union forces captured approximately 1,800 troops at Big Black, a loss that the Confederates could ill-afford. This battle sealed Vicksburg’s fate: the Confederate force was bottled up at Vicksburg. (NPS summary)
The Big Black River
Pemberton moved his army back to the last natural obstacle between Grant and Vicksburg; the Big Black River. There he was determined to make a stand awaiting the arrival of Loring’s lost division. In preparation for the crossing Pemberton had the railroad bridge “floored for the passage of even artillery and wagons.” A second bridge was cleverly created by chief engineer Major Samuel Lockett by stripping the steamer Dot of her machinery and setting her across the stream. The banks were cut and ramps built to supply passage across the river. Pemberton’s available forces were also increased by the appearance of BG John Vaughn’s Tennessee brigade which had come out from the Vicksburg defenses. These men were deployed on the east side of the river along with Bowen’s exhausted troops. A series of “skillfully constructed rifle pits” was made from dirt covered cotton bales. All that remained was to wait for Loring’s arrival.
Grant was in no mood to wait. He had the Confederate army on the run and intended on keeping it that way. He ordered the divisions of BG Eugene Carr and BG Peter Osterhaus to continue the march west at 0330. The skirmishers, the 33rd Illinois, almost immediately stumbled on to a large group of sleeping Confederate stragglers and made them all prisoners. At daybreak the 33rd made the first contact with the Confederate skirmishers at the bridgehead. Union forces deployed along the edge of a large open area with a natural moat formed by a “slough or bayou” between the two lines. “A spirited artillery engagement” began and one of the first casualties was BG Osterhaus who was directing his artillery. He was taken from the field with a thigh wound and command of his units passed to BG Albert Lee.
Sensing that the terrain in their front “made advance over this ground impracticable” Lee searched for a way to flank the enemy position. On the far right of the Union line 2nd Brigade of 14th Division (Carr) was sent to see what advantage might be gained there. BG Michael Lawler sent the 11th Wisconsin and 23rd Iowa forward screened by two companies of skirmishers. They gained a position at the bayou but became bogged down by the heavy fire from the Confederate fortifications. Colonel William Kinsman, commander of the 23rd Iowa offered a solution to the stalemate; a bayonet charge into the enemy works. Before Lawler would consent to such a bold plan he reinforced the two regiments with the 21st Iowa and placed the 22nd Iowa in reserve. The men were instructed to “reserve their fire until upon the rebel works.” At about 0900 Lawler’s men jumped up from their positions with a shout and charged. They were greeted with a storm of lead. In the three minutes it took to rush across the 400 yards of ground between the two lines Lawler’s men suffered 199 casualties (14k, 185 w) or 80% of all Union losses for the entire fight. The survivors of the assault across the field mounted the works. Vaughn’s Tennessee brigade collapsed, the entire lot fleeing or surrendering on the spot.
Only Green’s Arkansas brigade made any effort at resistance but that brief. The entire Confederate line dissolved into a mad race to the bridges. On the far right of the Confederate line three regiments of the Tennessee brigade (60th, 61st, and 62nd) attempted to sneak away to the south on the east bank of the river. They ran into Burbridge’s brigade that had deployed to find the Confederate flank there and nearly all were captured.
Lockett saw the developing crisis and ordered the bridges fired. Union troops were kept from the burning spans by rifle fire coming from the bluff on the west bank. Those Confederates left on the east side of the river had a difficult choice to make; surrender or swim for safety. Many attempted the latter and some were drowned in the process. The bridges were completely destroyed and Federal pursuit momentarily halted.
The brief engagement was another spectacular Union victory. Grant’s forces had grabbed up 1,751 prisoners, 18 pieces of artillery, and five battle flags for the cost of fewer than 300 casualties. The river would form a barrier only as long as it took to bring up the Union engineers. One of the most ingenious bridges of the war was built by Andrew Hickenlooper, chief engineer of McPherson’s corps. Using cotton bales as the base of a floating bridge Hickenlooper had XVIIth Corps over the river by early morning on the 18th.
In an interesting sidelight to the one-sided affair Grant was approached by BG William Dwight, of MG Nathaniel Banks’ staff. He was carrying a dispatch from Henry Halleck dated 11 May suggesting that they combine forces. The concept of sharing part of his command with the incompetent Banks appalled Grant. Having already abandoned that course once he was not about to readopt it in the face of success. Dwight insisted that the message represented a direct order from Halleck and it must be obeyed. In the midst of their discussion Lawler’s attack began and Grant rode away from the unsatisfied Dwight. There would be no unification of forces when Vicksburg lay within striking distance.
Pemberton’s men stumbled into Vicksburg broken, disorganized, and demoralized. The civilian population was shocked at what had become of the army. Throughout the day of the 17th a chaotic scene ensued as “wagons, cannon, horses, men, mules, stock, sheep, and everything you can imagine that appertains to an army” was brought into the city. Pemberton received a message from Johnston advising him to abandon the city and escape while the opportunity still existed. The Confederate commander called another council of war and it was decided to stay and defend the city. Johnston had neither the forces nor the will to do anything to help Pemberton now and informed Jefferson Davis that the city was doomed.
The Cotton Bridge at the Big Black River
After routing the Confederate defenders at the Big Black River crossing on June 17th the Federal commanders found their advance stalled by lack of bridges. The Confederate engineer, Major Samuel Lockett, had suceesfully supervised the destruction of the primary crossing despite the disorderly retreat from the area. CPT Andrew Hickenlooper, Chief Engineer of XVII Corps, and CPT Stewart Tresilian, Engineer Officer for 3rd Division of XVII Corps, were tasked with the construction of a new crossing north of the destroyed bridge. The location of the new bridge was 102 across water that was up to 30 feet deep. Lacking pontoon assets that had fallen behind the rapid Federal advance the two men devised a structure using the available material - cotton bales.
Writing about the bridge in his OR of the affair, CPT Tresilian described the costruction of the bridge this way;
"A small craft was first built of sufficient bouyancy to sustain two men, who carried the end of the shear line across and anchored it. The span was then accurately measured on the shear line. Two longtitudinal stringers, 12 by 16, and 34 feet long, were laid on the shore 10 feet apart and parallel to the current of the river, and strips of sheeting 1 inch thick were spiked on the stringers 2 feet 6 inches from center to center thus tying the stringers together. An end piece, the depth of the string pieces, was then spiked on the shore end of the structure, and the whloe turned upside down presenting the appearance of a large scow. Two cotton bales were then rolled in on the flat, and a piece of sheeting nailed in front of them traversely, pressing them tightly against the end piece. The same was repeated until the section was filled with cotton. Upright posts of scantling, 2 by 4, were now spiked to the stringers at the end of each cotton bale, and sawed off about 1 inch scant of the height of the cotton. After this, pieces of sheeting were spiked from upright to upright, passing over the center of the cotton bales. Five pieces of scantling, 2 by 4, were then spiked longtitudinally, resting on the sheeting crossing the bales of cotton, and on these were nailed the flooring. The sections were then floated into the stream and spiked together. Finally, the whole structure was lashed to the shear line and two small abutments, constructed of rails and bush."
The ingenious bridge supplied enough bouyancy to cross even the heaviest pieces of artillery. Tresilian noted that "a 20 pounder Parrott sunk the structure only 14 inches, leaving an excess bouyancy of 16 inches." This engineering feat allowed close pursuit of the retreating enemy who were forced into the defenses at Vicksburg.
| ||||||||
| |||||
